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CHAPTER 17 
State and Municipal Government 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN 
A. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
§17.1. Public welfare: Enforcement of lien on real estate. The 
provisions of G.L., c. 188A, §4,l relative to the enforcement of liens on 
real estate of recipients of old age assistance, had not been construed by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in certain respects2 prior to the case of 
Town of Tisbury v. Hutchinson.a In this case, the plaintiff town had 
filed a bill in equity against the administratrix of the estate of one 
Chadwick to enforce a lien, a certificate of which on earlier date had 
been recorded in the registry of deeds against real estate owned by 
Chadwick at his death. After Chadwick's death, real estate taxes and 
interest thereon accrued in the amount of $620.68. Under Section 4 
of Chapter 188A, whether a lien for old age assistance may be enforced 
after a recipient's death depends upon whether the fair market value 
of the recipient's real estate and the cash surrender value of the recip-
ient's life insurance "at the time of his decease" exceed $1500. There-
fore, a town, asserting a lien for old age assistance under Section 4, may 
not have recourse to the first $1500 of value of the real estate and in-
surance in order to satisfy that lien; however, the Supreme Judicial 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars and prac· 
tices in New Bedford. He is former Assistant Attorney General of the Common-
wealth in charge of the Criminal Division and is now City Solicitor for the city of 
New Bedford. 
§17.1. 1 Section 4, as amended in 1951, reads in part as follows: "The ownership 
... of an interest in real estate by an applicant ... shall not disqualify him from 
receiving [old age] assistance ... provided, however, that the town shall take a lien 
on such property as a condition of granting old age assistance. . . . 
"The town shall place on record in the proper registry of deeds ... an instru-
ment ... creating a lien upon such real estate for the amount of assistance paid 
by it, including amounts paid subsequently to the recording of the lien, which 
lien shall be prior to any lien thereafter recorded. . .. Such lien shall be enforce-
able by a ... bill in equity. . .. No lien shall be enforced under this section 
when the combined value of the recipient'S interest in real estate at the time of his 
decease, based on fair market value, together with the amount of cash surrender 
value in life insurance exempted under section five, amounts in the aggregate to 
fifteen hundred dollars or less." 
2 Henderson v. Town of Yarmouth. 335 Mass. 647, 141 N.E.2d 518 (1957); Weaver 
v. City of New Bedford. 335 Mass. 644. 140 N.E.2d 309 (1957). 
a 338 Mass. 514. 155 N .E.2d 876 (1959). 
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Court held in the present case that no provision of Section 4 precludes 
a town from asserting its lien for taxes' against the first $1500 of value. 
The Court, in affirming the decree of the lower court, found that the 
trial judge had properly ordered the amount of taxes accruing after the 
death of Chadwick to be deducted from the first $1500 of proceeds of 
the sale. It was also noted by the Court, in passing upon several collat-
eral questions arising out of the factual situation in the case, that a 
lien of a town for old age assistance is not subordinated by anything in 
Section. 4 to the expenses of administering the estate of a deceased re-
cipient of assistance - the right to sell real estate to pay debts and ex-
penses given by G.L., c. 202, §§l, 2 and 14, is subject to liens existing 
at the time of the recipient'S death.1I Also, a town is not barred by 
laches in enforcing its lien;6 and public auction is a reasonable method 
of judicial sale to enforce a lien when equitable enforcement of the lien 
is expressly authorized as under Section 4.7 
§17.2. Tort: Liability for negligence arising out of operation of 
water system. The 1959 SURVEY year brought forth no substantially 
new developments in the law of tort liability arising out of the negli-
gence of a municipality in connection with its commercial undertak-
ings. In D'Urso v. Town of Methuen,! the plaintiff received verdicts 
for personal injury and property damage to his automobile when he 
ran into a trench, excavated by the water department of the defendant 
town upon a public way. The defendant town contended that it was 
not liable except for a defect in the highway under G.L., c. 84, §15, and 
that the plaintiff could not recover unless the negligence of the town 
was the sole cause of his injury; the town in effect contended that if 
the negligence of the plaintiff was a contributing cause of the accident 
there could be no recovery under Section 15.2 The short answer, of 
course, to this contention was that the plaintiff was not confined to the 
Section 15 statutory remedy; he was free to pursue his remedy at com-
mon law, for here the defendant town was engaged in a commercial 
rather than a governmental undertaking.3 The Court in its decision 
cited the case of Sloper v. City of Quincy' wherein it had held that a 
municipality was liable for negligence in digging a trench in connection 
with its water system "just as a private corporation would be liable in 
4 G.L.. c. 60. §37. as amended through Acts of 1943. c. 478. §l. 
1\ See Tyndale v. Stanwood. 182 Mass. 534. 536. 66 N.E. 23. 24 (1903); 1 New-
hall. Settlement of Estates §1l9. at 358·359 (4th ed. 1958). 
6 See Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General. 327 Mass. 310. 326. 98 N.E.2d 621. 
632 (1951). 
7 See National R.adiator Corp. v. Parad. 297 Mass. 314. 319·320. 8 N.E.2d 794. 796-
797 (1937). 
§17.2. 1338 Mass. 73.153 N.E.2d 655 (1958). 
2Ige v. City of Cambridge. 208 Mass. 571. 576. 95 N.E. 557.558·559 (1911). 
SIver Johnson Sporting Goods Co. v. City of Boston. 334 Mass. 401. 135 N.E.2d 
658 (1956); Cole Drug Co. of Massachusetts v. City of Boston. 326 Mass. 199. 93 
N.E.2d 556 (1950); Hand v. Inhabitants of Brookline. 126 Mass. 324 (1879). 
4301 Mass. 20. 24.16 N.E.2d 14. 17 (1938). 
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performing a similar service." In the D'Urso case, as in the Sloper 
case, as the liability of the defendant did not arise from a failure on its 
part to keep the way in proper repair, but arose from its act of digging 
a pit and leaving it insufficiently or improperly filled and unguarded, 
in the course of its conduct in maintaining a commercial water system, 
C.L., c. 84, §18, relative to notice of injury, did not apply. 
An interesting question of damages arose in Bond Pharmacy, Inc. v. 
City of Cambridge,5 in which the plaintiff, in an action of tort, sought 
to recover for the alleged negligence of the defendant in allowing 
water to enter the plaintiff's premises. The Court pointed out that 
even if there were negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff 
could not recover if the damage caused by this negligence was purely 
conjectural, a point which was well illustrated by the recent case of A. 
DaPrato Co. v. City of Boston.6 In the DaPrato case there was evidence 
warranting a finding of negligent delay in shutting off the water, but 
because there was no evidence from which a jury could find the extent 
of damage caused by the delay, the defendant received a directed verdict. 
However, in the Bond Pharmacy case, the damage caused by the delay 
in shutting off the water was not a matter of conjecture. On the basis 
of the testimony of an employee of the plaintiff that he called the water 
department at five o'clock, and in view of the testimony of the super-
intendent of the water department, that it took "approximately an 
hour" to close the circuit, the jury could have found that the water 
should have been shut off at about six o'clock and that the damage oc-
curring after that time was chargeable to the defendant on the basis 
that the delay of four hours could be found to be negligent.7 Earlier 
cases, embracing similar facts, have held that plaintiffs are not obliged 
to establish their damages with the "exactness of mathematical dem-
onstration." 8 
§17.3. Nuisances: Injunctions. A final decree in equity was en-
tered enjoining the town from maintaining a nuisance in the operation 
of the town dump in Turner v. Town of Oxford) The judge in the 
lower court found that papers, rubbish and other waste material were 
scattered over a portion of the plaintiff's land, which abuts and adjoins 
the parcel of land used by the town as a public dump, and that this 
condition constituted a trespass to the plaintiff's land and amounted 
to a nuisance. However, the judge expressly found that the plaintiff 
had suffered no damage. In view of this latter finding, the Supreme 
Judicial Court did not decide whether the town could be held liable 
at law for damages resulting from the operation of the dump by its 
5338 Mass. 448, 156 N.E.2d 34 (1959). 
6334 Mass. 186, 134 N.E.2d 438 (1956). 
7 See Cole Drug Co. of Massachusetts v. City of Boston, 326 Mass. 199, 200'201, 
93 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1950). 
8 Dalton v. Demos Bros. General Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377, 378-379, 135 
N.E.2d 646, 647-648 (1956); Piper v. Childs, 290 Mass. 560, 563, 195 N.E. 763, 764 
(1935). 
§17.3. 1338 Mass. 286,155 N.E.2d 182 (1959). 
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board of health.!! The Court, in affirming the decree of the lower 
court, was of the opinion that the lower court's decree was too broad, 
and confined its final decree to a prohibition of what the judge had 
found to be objectionable. The town was thus enjoined from permit-
ting the dump to be used in a manner resulting in the scattering of 
papers, rubbish and other waste material over any portion of the plain-
tiff's land. 
In the case of Board of Health of Woburn v. Sousa,3 the defendants 
were by final decree permanently enjoined from keeping swine on cer-
tain premises in Woburn and from transporting offensive substances 
through the streets of Woburn, without in each instance obtaining a 
permit as required by the regulations of the board.4 The defendants 
had been keeping about a thousand swine on their premises and had 
been transporting offensive materials through the streets without ob-
taining permits. It was noted by the Court that boards of health, al-
though not without authority to institute a suit for the town, never· 
theless should bring it in the name of the town.5 Pursuant to at least 
three legislative delegations of power, G.L., c. Ill, §§31, 122 and 143, 
boards of health of cities or towns may require a permit for keeping 
swine. Inhabitants of Quincy v. Kennard6 held it was within the power 
of a board of health to require a permit for the keeping of swine as a 
condition of doing what could have been absolutely prohibited. The 
requirement of a permit is a traditional method of regulation, and a 
regulation calling for a permit certainly may be adopted when there 
exists some statutory delegation of authority - as here may be found 
in Section 143 -- to prohibit absolutely. 
§17.4. Eminent domain: Damages and validity of taking. The 
petitioners, in Swan v. City of Newton,! owned land abutting on a pri-
vate way 40 feet wide (Brentwood Avenue) appearing on a plan dated 
1923, and recorded with the registry of deeds; however, prior to 1955, 
it had a dirt surface and, as a private way, was in fact constructed and 
used only to a width of 24 feet. On February 7, 1955, the defendant 
city took by eminent domain an easement for a public street 40 feet 
wide. The petitioners, in the year 1950, completed a house on their 
land which included a basement garage below the ground surface level, 
with access by a driveway declining from the traveled edge of the pri-
vate way to the garage; the petitioners' driveway, therefore, had a grad-
ual slope leading from the garage to the edge of the dirt road. At the 
2 Gosselin v. Town of Northbridge, 296 Mass. !l51, 352·353, 5 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1937). 
3338 Mass. 547, 156 N.E.2d 52 (1959). 
4 The regulations so far as here relevant read: "1. No individual ... shall keep 
... swine within the limits of this municipality without first obtaining a permit 
from the board of health. . .. 2. A license to transport garbage, offal or other 
offensive substances along the public highways of this municipality must be obtained 
from the board of health in accordance with Chapter HI, Section 3IA." 
5 See Board of Health of Wareham v. Marine By·Products Co., 329 Mass. 174, 175, 
107 N.E.2d II, II·12 (1952). 
6151 Mass. 563, 24 N.E. 860 (1890). 
§17.4. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733,158 N.E.2d 347. 
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trial there was testimony given that trees, bushes, brush and rubbish 
went to the edge of the dirt road. After February 7, 1955, the city 
constructed the avenue as a public street, 24 feet wide; in addition, the 
city also constructed sidewalks 8 feet wide on each side of the avenue 
approximately six and a half inches above the road level. The grade of 
the driveway was so altered as to deprive the petitioners of the use of 
the garage and the driveway as means of access thereto; it was also 
found by the jury that the petitioners' driveway as it existed prior to 
1955 did not unreasonably obstruct the rights of others in Brentwood 
Avenue as a private way. 
The question whether "the petitioners were barred from recovering 
damages for the loss of use of their garage and . . . driveway" was sub-
mitted to the Supreme Judicial Court for determination. The Court 
was of the opinion that the action of the board of survey of Newton in 
approving the plan upon which Brentwood Avenue appeared as a 
private way 40 feet wide, prior to any city action laying out a public 
highway or taking land for a highway, did not prevent the petitioners 
from using the undeveloped area in any way that did not interfere 
with the existing rights of others, so long as the petitioners did not con-
struct over that undeveloped land a "way for public use" in a manner 
inconsistent with the approved plan:2 the city gained no rights in the 
avenue other than the power to require that action to construct a way 
for public use, if taken by persons having rights in the avenue, should 
comply with the plan. And since it was found by the jury that the pe-
titioners' pre-1955 driveway did not "unreasonably obstruct the rights 
of others" in Brentwood Avenue as a private way, and in view of the 
fact that the city gained no rights in the avenue by the approval of the 
1923 plan, the petitioners, therefore, when taking was made in 1955, 
were entitled to maintain for their own private use their driveway as 
it then was.3 The city action, in making a formal taking to establish 
Brentwood Avenue, thus took from the petitioners substantial value 
existing in their driveway and caused them damage; the petitioners 
were not barred, by any interest of the city or others, from seeking as-
sessment of such damage under C.L., c. 79. 
Although Garabedian v. City of Worcester4 arose out of a petition 
for the assessment of damages from the taking of the petitioner's land 
by the city of Worcester, the exceptions which brought the case before 
the Supreme Judicial Court involved the judge's charge to the jury. 
The judge explained to the jury adequately and clearly that the meas-
ure of damages for the taking was the fair market value of the prop-
erty;5 however, he suspended his charge at four o'clock and continued 
2 See Crocker's Notes on Common Forms §839 at 453 (7th ed., Swaim, 1955). 
3 Carter v. Sullivan, 281 Mass. 217, 225, 183 N.E. 343, 346·347 (1932). See Perry v. 
Hewitt, 314 Mass. 346, 350, 50 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1943); 3 Tiffany, Real Property §811 
(3d ed. 1939). 
4338 Mass. 48,153 N.E.2d 622 (1958). 
5G.L., c. 79, §12; Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 299,58 
N.E.2d 135, 137 (1944). 
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with it on the following morning. This being a split charge, the judge 
was requested by the petitioner to restate the entire charge. The Court, 
in overruling the exceptions of the petitioners, stated that the lapsed 
time between the first and second parts of the charge was not of suffi-
cient duration to require, on the resumption of the charge, a restate-
ment of what previously had been said, and that the need for repeti· 
tion was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.6 
Another case originating under a petition for the assessment of dam-
ages under G.L., c. 79, was Parrotta v. Commonwealth.7 The petition-
ers therein alleged that they owned a parcel of land located at a comer 
in the city of Chelsea. On January 4, 1955, the Commonwealth's De-
partment of Public Works laid out and took over a certain road to be a 
limited access highway in accordance with the provisions of G.L., c. 81, 
§7c. The public work in the area immediately adjacent to the land 
of the petitioners consisted in part of tearing up the public ways 
that abutted the comer, the building of a subsurface road, and then 
the building, by way of a roof over the subsurface highway, of a new 
level upon which to relocate the former public ways. The plans for 
the public work entailed the closing of the public highways abutting 
and adjacent to the land of the petitioners; the construction, of neces-
sity, seriously interfered with the use of the petitioners' real estate, 
diminished the value thereof and caused loss to petitioners. These hap-
penings took place without any formal taking of real estate. Not-
withstanding the absence of a formal taking, G.L., c. 81, §7, neverthe· 
less provides: "When injury has been caused to the real estate of any 
person by the laying out or alteration of a state highway, he may reo 
cover compensation therefor from the commonwealth under chapter 
seventy.nine." Furthermore, G.L., C. 81, §7c, states: "If a limited access 
way is laid out in whole or in part in the location of an existing public 
way, the owners of land abutting upon such existing public way shall 
be entitled to recover damages under chapter seventy.nine for the tak· 
ing of or injury to their easements of access to such public way." In 
view of these two statutes, compensation under G.L., C. 79, is recover-
able whether or not there was a partial taking of land.s 
§17.5. School committee: Inadequate appropriation and employee 
compensation. Decisions during the 1959 SURVEY year, as in recent 
years, manifest the readiness with which the Supreme Judicial Court 
will view litigation in this field as attempts to impair the traditional 
supremacy of the school committee in the field of education. This pro-
pensity was shown in Graves V. Town of Fairhaven,! in which a peti-
tion was brought under G.L., C. 71, §34, to determine the amount of 
the deficiency in the appropriation by the respondent town for the sup-
port of its public schools for the year 1957. The town appealed the de-
6 Wenton V. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 82,138 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1956). 
71959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1019, 159 N.E.2d 342. 
S See Nichols V. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581,584, 121 N.E.2d 56, 58 (1954). 
§17.5. 1338 Mass. 290, 155 N.E.2d 178 (1959). 
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cree entered by the lower court ordering the town to provide, by bor-
rowing, the amount of the deficiency together with a further sum rep-
resenting 25 percent of the amount of the deficiency. 
The salient facts were as follows: The school committee, on or about 
January 10, 1957, submitted its school budget to the town finance com-
mittee. Subsequently, on February 28, 1957, the school committee 
voted to amend and increase its request; however, this amended request 
was never formally presented in writing to the finance committee. At 
the annual town meeting on March 9, 1957, a motion in accordance 
with the school committee's amended request was defeated, the town 
appropriating a substantially reduced figure. The defendant town 
contended that in order to arrive at any figure constituting "a defi-
ciency" within the meaning of G.L., c. 71, §34, the court below was re-
quired to have before it evidence of the amount necessary to support 
the public schools for the year in question and evidence that the ap-
propriations made and included in the annual budget were insufficient 
to meet that figure. Although this argument appeared not to be to-
tally without merit, the Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless sloughed 
this contention off by stating: "If this is an argument that we should 
overrule the long line of cases2 [that have previously been decided by 
the Court], the challenge comes much too late." In answer to the con-
tention that the school budget (presented to the finance committee on 
January 10, 1957) was not submitted seasonably, the Court quoted the 
language of earlier cases3 which previously held that G.L., c. 44, §3Ia, 
requiring municipal department heads in cities to submit detailed es-
timates for the ensuing year by December I, did not apply to the school 
committee;4. similarly, compliance by the school committee of a town 
with G.L., c. 41, §59,5 is not a condition precedent to relief under G.L., 
c. 71, §34.8 
The question whether the city council had power to prescribe hours 
of employment for the janitors employed in the public schools of the 
city of Gloucester was the issue raised in O'Connell v. School Commit-
tee of Gloucester.7 The plaintiffs, janitors employed in the public 
schools of the city, in behalf of themselves and as a committee repre-
senting other employees doing similar work, brought a bill in equity 
for declaratory relief whereby they sought a declaration that certain 
2 Illig v. Town of Plymouth, 337 Mass. 259, 149 N.E.2d 140 (1958); Lynch v. City 
of Fall River, 556 Mass. 558, 147 N.E.2d 152 (1958); Leonard v. School Committee of 
Springfield, 241 Mass. 525, U5 N.E. 459 (1922). 
8 See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.5. 
4. See Lynch v. City of Fall River, 556 Mass. 558, 147 N.E.2d 152 (1958); Young v. 
City of Worcester, 555 Mass. 724, 726, U5 N.E.2d 211, 212·215 (1956); Hayes v. 
City of Brockton, 515 Mass. 641, 649,48 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1945). 
5 G.L., c. 41, §59 provides in part as follows: "committees •.. of a town author· 
ized by law to expend money shall furnish to the town accountant . . . not less than 
ten days before the end of the town financial year, detailed estimates of the amounts 
necessary for the proper maintenance of the departments under their jurisdiction 
for the ensuing year." 
8 See Illig v. Town of Plymouth, 557 Mass. 259, 149 N.E.2d 140 (1958). 
T 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957,158 N.E.2d 868. 
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ordinances enacted by the city council in 19468 were applicable to them 
and entitled them to the ·benefits of a forty-hour week and time and 
one-half pay for overtime. The custodial personnel of the city's 
schools had made numerous demands upon the school committee to 
establish a forty-hour week for them since the 1946 ordinances were 
passed and the school committee had consistently refused to accede to 
these demands. The lower court ordered the entry of a final decree 
declaring that the ordinances in question, enacted by the city council, 
did not apply to the plaintiffs, and that the Gloucester school commit-
tee at all times since the effective date of the ordinances had exclusive 
jurisdiction to fix the hours of employment and the compensation of 
the plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the decree of the lower 
court, predicated its decision upon G.L., c. 71,§68, which provides, 
inter alia, that "school committees, unless the town otherwise directs, 
shall have general charge and superintendence of the schoolhouses, 
[and] shall keep them in good order." The Court had on earlier occa-
sion construed this statute in the case of Ring v. City of Woburn,9 
wherein it was held that the duty imposed upon school committees to 
maintain schoolhouses included by necessary implication the power 
to employ janitors and custodians. That case held also that the city 
was required by G.L., c. 71, §34, to provide money for janitors' salaries 
in the amounts fixed by the school committee. Quite obviously, the 
control given by these statutes to the school committee over the school 
buildings and grounds and the duty to keep the buildings in good 
order coupled with the committee's power to employ and fix the com-
pensation of those employed in this work includes the power to fix 
their hours of employment. Prior decisions of the Supreme Judicial 
Court have left no doubt that the committee's power in this respect 
was exclusive. Furthermore, in this case, since the city of Gloucester 
was operating at this time under a Plan E charter, Section 33 of G.L., 
c. 43, clearly solved the. question raised; it is there provided that the 
school committee may "appoint, suspend or remove at pleasure such 
subordinate officers or assistants, including janitors of school buildings, 
as it may deem necessary for the proper discharge of its duties and the 
conduct of its business; it shall define their terms of service and their 
duties, and shall fix their compensation." 
Actions of contract were brought by the plaintiffs in Collins v. City 
of Boston,1° in which they sought to recover unpaid balances of com-
pensation for their services during the 1951-1952 school year. It should 
be noted that the legislature has enacted a long series of acts dealing 
specifically with the powers of the Boston school committee. The pro-
visions of one statute applicable in this case confers upon the school 
committee the broad and unusual power whereby four fifths of aU 
8 The ordinances. in question in substance established a five-day, forty-hOur work 
week for all the employees i~ the "labor service ___ of the city_" 
11311 Mass. 679; 687-688, 43 N_E.2d 8,13-14 (1942). 
10338 Mass_ 704, 157 N .E.2d 399 (1959). 
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members of the committee are empowered to appropriate -directly 
funds for school purposes. 
The defendant school committee on April 2, 1951, appropriated the 
maximum amount authorized by statute, which fell short of the sum 
necessary to meet the needs of the school system. The city council on 
June 4, 1951, appropriated an additional sum of $1,000,000, specifying 
that $755,258 of that total was for "instruction." Later that year on 
August 31, 1951, after all appropriations for the fiscal year 1951 had 
been made, the school committee voted a new schedule of compensa-
tion granting increases in pay to take effect as of September 1, 1951. 
The auditor and treasurer of the defendant city refused to pay the in-
creases granted by the school committee's vote of August 31, 1951, on 
the ground that there was no appropriation available at the time the 
vote was passed and it was, therefore, illegal and void. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, in holding that the school committee vote of August 
31, 1951, was valid, rejected the argument of the defendant· city that 
the Collins case was not governed by the principle announced in 
Leonard v. School Committee of Springfieldp which held that G.L., c. 
42, §32, "did not effect any change in the powers of a school committee 
to establish the salaries of teachers within the total amounts appro-
priated for school purposes." The Court was unable to find any pro~ 
vision limiting the Boston school committee, in any respect here rele-
vant, ~n its freedom to deal with funds which the committee itself had 
power to appropriate for school purposes. Since there was an appro-
priation available here, the basic question was whether the Boston 
school committee lacked the power to reallocate sums already appro-
priated for instruction in order to provide for the salary increases. The 
Court found no applicable statutes that deprived the school committee 
of freedom of action with respect to any part of the appropriation 
available for instruction. 
§17.6. Municipal finance: Expenditure of public money for public 
purpose. City of Boston v. Merchants National Bank of Boston1 
served to remove some constitutional doubts relative to the erection, 
with public funds, of buildings in which public and private purposes 
would be jointly served. In this case, the city of Boston was author-
ized and empowered under Acts of 1954, c. 164, "to construct, operate 
and maintain at a convenient location in said city a municipal audito-
rium." By a later statute,2 the city was further authorized to borrow 
money outside its debt limit for the purpose of constructing the audi-
torium and to that end accepted the defendant bank's bid for tem-
porary notes. Subsequently, the defendant bank advised that it would 
refuse to complete the purchase of the notes owing to "substantial 
doubt as to the constitutionality of the enabling legislation." Perhaps 
11241 Mass. 525, 155 N.E. 459 (1922), discussed. in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§19.5. 
§17.6. 15118 Mass. 245,154 N.E.2d 702 (1958). 
:I Ac~~ of 1957, c. 718, §IA. 
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the defendant's doubt was engendered by the action of the auditorium 
commission in directing the architects to design the municipal audio 
torium so that it would be suitable not only for public exercises and 
hearings but also for rental for privately sponsored exhibitions and 
shows. That money raised by taxation can be used only for public pur-
poses and not for the advantage of private individuals is an established 
and undoubted principle of constitutionallaw.3 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in its decision that the erection of the 
proposed auditorium was a public purpose, noted that Boston, a cul-
tural, educational, and historical center, might disappear from the list 
of great convention cities were it to have no indoor place suitable for 
public gatherings of about five thousand people. The defendant bank, 
in its brief, stated that the city's interpretation of the statute showed 
that "the General Court, as well as the city, contemplated the construc-
tion of a building in which public and private purposes were to be 
jointly served, and that included in the building were facilities un-
needed for public use and required only for private or commercial pur-
pose." The summary answer to this contention would be that any in-
terpretation by municipal officials has slight, if any, significance in 
ascertaining legislative intent; however, the Court, obviously with an 
eye towards the conservation of tax dollars, made the practical com-
ment that the structure need not be designed so as to become an un-
necessary drain on the taxpayers; that if a sound financial scheme em-
braces facilities that tend to make possible a more nearly full-time use, 
it is not to be presumed that the dominant purpose ceases to be public 
and becomes private.4 
§17.7. Compensation plans: Acceptance, revocation and amend-
ment. In Brucato V. City of Lawrence,1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
was faced with the problem of whether a city or town, which once ac-
cepts a statute enacted subject to local acceptance, retains the power 
to revoke its acceptance. The plaintiffs, welfare department workers, 
on September 16, 1957, were receiving the salaries then provided under 
a compensation plan established under G.L., C. 31, §47D. On Septem-
ber 16, 1957, the city council voted to accept G.L., C. 31, §47E, which 
provided that certain annual "step-rate" pay increases be given to em-
ployees under the compensation plan. On January 13, 1958, the city 
council voted to rescind the action taken on September 16, 1957. The 
mayor refused to provide any 1957 supplemental appropriation to pay 
for the increases in pay of employees of the welfare department in that 
year; The city auditor disallowed payments of any increase in salary 
to these employees on the ground that payment would be in violation 
of G.L., C. 44, §33A,2 giving as a reason that the city budget for 1957 
8 Opinion of the Justices, lI20 Mass. 77l1. 775. 67 N.E.2d 588. 590 (1946); Opinion 
of the Justices. 2111 Mass. 6OlI. 611. 122 N.E. 76l1. 766 (1919). 
4 See Talbot V. Hudson. 16 Gray 417.422 (Ma •. 1860). 
§17.7. 1338 Mass. 612. 156 N.E.2d 676 (1959). ' 
2 Section 33A reads: "The annual budget shall include sums sufficient to pay the 
salaries of officers and employees fixed by law or by ordinance. . •. No ordinance 
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had been adopted on March 4, 1957, and did not include a provision 
for any increases for the plaintiffs. 
That the legislature may provide that a statute expressed in terms of 
general application shall take effect in each city and town only upon 
its acceptance by such city or town, or by some public body in that 
community, is neither unusual nor uncommon.s A vote of the desig-
nated body accepting the legislation for any particular city or town is 
thus made a condition precedent to any effectiveness of the statute in 
that city or town. It cannot be questioned that the legislature may 
provide that a city or town which once accepts a statute enacted sub-
ject to local acceptance shall have power to revoke its acceptance; how-
ever, in the absence of some indication in the language, the form or 
the subject matter of a particular statute enacted subject to local ac-
ceptance that an acceptance once given may be revoked, the effect of 
a valid acceptance by a city or town is to make the statute operative in 
that community until the statute is repealed or amended. Therefore, 
once the condition precedent stipulated by the legislature to the tak-
ing effect of the statute in the community is satisfied, it becomes ap-
plicable statute law, subject to change, as in the case of other statutes, 
only by subsequent action of the legislature.4 General Laws, c. 31, 
§47E, accepted by the city council on September 16, 1957, contains no 
express provision for revocation of a city's acceptance of the section, 
once validly given; consequently, if the acceptance of Section 47E on 
September 16, 1957, was effective, the city could not thereafter rescind 
its acceptance, and the vote of rescission on January 18, 1958, would 
thus be rendered a nullity. 
The defendant city contended that the acceptance of Section 47E 
was invalid because made in violation of G.L., c. 44, §33A,G in which 
two prohibitions here pertinent provide that (a) "no ordinance pro-
viding for an increase in ... salaries ... shall be enacted ... ex-
cept by a two thirds vote of the city council, nor unless it is to be opera-
tive for more than three months during the financial year in which it 
is passed," and, (b) no "increase in rate [shall be] made by ordinance, 
[or] vote ... during the financial year subsequent to the submission 
of the annual budget unless provision therefor has been made by 
providing for an increase in the salaries or wages of municipal officers or employees 
shall be enacted except by a two thirds vote of the city council, nor unless it is 
to be operative for more than three months during the financial year in which it is 
passed. . .. No new position shall be created or increase in rate made by ordinance. 
vote or appOintment during the financial year subsequent to the submission of the 
annual budget unless provision therefor has been made by means of a supplemental 
appropriation ... 
S Robinson v. Selectmen of Watertown. !I!I6 Mass. 557. 546. 146 N.E.2d 900. 906· 
907 (1957); Mayor of Gloucester v. City Clerk of Gloucester. 527 Mass. 460. 464. 99 
N.E.2d 452. 455 (1951); Graham v. Roberts. 200 Mass. 152. 157·158. 85 N.E. 1009. 
101l·10l2 (1908). 
4See Holt Lumber Co. v. City of Oconto. 145 Wis. 500. 505·507. 1!l0 N.W. 709. 
711·712 (1911); Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder. IllI Wis. 516. 552·533. 89 N.W. 460. 
464465 (1902); 2 McQuillan. Municipal Corporations §9.15 (3d ed. 1949). 
5 Quoted in note 2 supra. 
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means of a supplemental appropriation." Clearly, the city council's 
acceptance of G.L., c. 31, §47E, in September, 1957, made the section 
applicable as statute law to Lawrence for three months in 1957; but, 
under the wording of Section 47E, no step-rate increase for any em-
ployee could result until July 1, 1958: thus, Section 47E would have 
no practical effect by way of requiring expenditure until July 1, 1958. 
Obviously, this type of salary increase would have had precisely the 
substantive effect which G.L., c. 44, §33A, of the municipal finance act 
seems designed to prevent: the enactmerit by a city council in one finan-
cial year of a salary to have no effect by way of expenditure in that 
year but requiring expenditures in later years. The Court, however, 
in reading G.L., c. 31, §47E, together with G.L., c. 44, §33A, noted that 
Section 47E required a vote by a simple majority of the council to be-
come effective whereas the restrictions of Section 33A required a two-
thirds vote of the city council for salary increases. The Court thus 
took this anomaly as an indication that the legislature did not effec-
tively provide that the" prohibitions of Section 33A were to be appli-
cable.to an acceptance of Section 47E by a city council; therefore, the 
provisions of Sectiori 47E were accepted by a valid vote of the city 
council which could not be rescinded on January 13, 1958. 
The validity and effect of a vote of the annual town meeting pur-
porting to amend the classification and pay plan of the town, by in-
creasing salaries, was at issue in Blomquist v. Town of Arlington.6 
In 1949, in accordance with G.L., c. 41, §108A, the town adopted a 
classification and pay plan which, at an adjourned session of the annual 
town meeting, duly called and held on March 20, 1957, it attempted 
to amend. Upon the motion, there being 106 votes in the affirmative 
and 91 in the negative, the moderator declared that the motion was lost 
because it lacked a majority of the entire membership of 251, which he 
ruled was necessary to amend a by-law under Robert's Rules of Order. 
The master in the court below had found that the by-laws of the de-
fendant town contained a provision that "the government of the town 
meeting shall be determined by the rules of practice contained in 
Robert's Rules of Order Revised (75th Anniversary Edition)/' which 
rules required that a by-law be amended by a vote of the majority of 
the entire membership. The Court pointed out that the topics made 
subject to "the rules of practice contained in Robert's Rules," such as 
the government of town meetings, were matters of procedure, and that 
the legal effect of "any given number of votes upon any subject con-
sidered was a "matter of substantive law.7 If the town by-laws were 
given the meaning ruled by the moderator, and as here contended by 
the town, the town by-laws would be in excess of the authority con-
ferred by the enablingact8 and would thus constitute an impairment 
of the authority of the town meeting to act by majority vote. 
6 SS8 Mass. 594, 156 N.E.2d 416 (1959). 
7 Ogden v. Selectmen of Freetown, 258 Mass. IS9, 141, 154 N.E. 555, 555-556 (1927). 
8 G.L., c. S9, §15,:" provides: "A town may pass by-laws, subject to this section, for 
the regulation of the proceedings at town meetings." 
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§17.8. Contracts: Competitive bidding and specifications. A case 
of first impression in the Commonwealth was Pacella v. Metropolitan 
District Commission,1 in which a petition under G.L., c. 29,§63, was 
brought to enjoin the awarding of a public contract for the construction 
of certain water distribution lines. The specifications issued by the 
awarding authority called for the use of a particular type of patented 
pipe which was then being exclusively manufactured· and sold by only 
one company. The master in the lower court found, however, that 
there was in common use an alternative to this patented pipe which 
was functionally its equal in every respect. The petitioners did not 
suggest that there had been a failure to comply with the formal pro-
cedural requirements of G.L., c. 29, §8A; they contended that the 
specifications, which were publicly advertised, were so unreasonably 
restrictive in scope that true competition was precluded and that the 
situation was one in which the form of an invitation for competing 
bids was complied with, yet the substance was subverted by the delib-
erate adoption of specifications that required the use of a single man-
ufacturer's product, and foreclosed bidders from offering the func-
tionally equal product of others. In view of the lack of applicable 
Massachusetts precedents, the petitioners argued that courts in other 
jurisdictions had construed statutes requiring public advertisement for 
proposals for government work as implying also a requirement of 
specifications that actually invite competition not only (a) among 
persons bidding against each other for the completed work, but· also 
(b) among suppliers of component materials or equipment. Much au-
thority was cited by the petitioners in which it was held that specifica-
tions cannot properly specify a patented product unless products 
functionally equivalent are also permitted.2 The Supreme Judicial 
Court, however, rejected these cases as stating the rule too broadly~ 
And from the labyrinth of conflicting authority elsewhere, the Court 
chose to adopt, as the better rule, the proposition that a patented arti~le 
may be specified under the requirement of competitive bidding.s 
B. STATE GOVERNMENT 
§17.9. Right of public employees to join vocational or labor or-
ganizations. A new Section 178D was added to Chapter 149 of the 
General Laws wherein the right to form or join vocational or labor 
organizations was given to employees of the Commonwealth or of any 
of its political subdivisions. However, this section was not made ap-
plicable to police officers so employed.1 
§17.8. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 941,159 N.E.2d 75. 
2 Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699, 707 (1868); Monoghan v. City of 
Indianapolis, 37 Ind. App. 280, 286-295, 76 N.E. 424, 425-428 (1906); Dean v. Charl-
ton, 23 Wis. 590, 601-602 (1869). 
S Connecticut v. Board of Purchase Be Supplies of Stamford, III Conn. 147, 156-162, 
149 Ad. 410, 413-415 (1930); Adams v. Van Zandt, 199 N.Y. Supp. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1923); 
see also 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §29.42 (3d ed. 1949). 
§17.9. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 460. 
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§17.10. Hours of work without interval for meal. Chapter 149, 
Section 100, of the General Laws, subsequent to the 1957 amendment, 
provided that no woman was to be employed for more than six hours 
at one time in a factory, manufacturing or mechanical establishment 
or workshop without an interval of at least thirty minutes for a meal; 
those women so employed in a mercantile establishment for the same 
length of time were to have an interval of forty-five minutes for a 
meal. It was further provided that a child was not to be employed for 
more than six hours at anyone time without an interval of at least 
forty-five minutes for a meal. The amendment to this section passed 
during the 1959 SURVEY yearl made a slight change whereby minors-
who before this amendment were to have forty-five-minute intervals 
for meals with no reference made to the particular work performed-
were to be given the same treatment as women whereby they would 
have thirty-minute intervals and forty-five-minute intervals for meals 
dependent upon the type of work performed. 
§17.11. Witness fees for state police officers. Section 53B of G.L., 
c. 262, concerning witness fees for state police officers attending court 
as witnesses, allowed such officers on duty at night, or on vacation or 
furlough, or on a day off, a witness fee in the amount of three dollars 
for each day's attendance except for the first attendance as arresting 
officer. Acts of 1959, c. 57, amended the section to allow a three-dollar 
witness fee for such attendance inclusive of the first day's attendance 
as arresting officer. 
§17.12. Embalmers and funeral directors: Reciprocal agreements. 
By Chapter 528 of the Acts of 1958, an amendment was made to G.L., 
c. 112, by inserting therein a new Section 85A whereby the Board of 
Registration in Embalming and Funeral Directing is authorized to 
enter into reciprocal agreements with other states, allowing its licen-
sees to conduct funerals in such other states. 
§17.l0. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 461. 
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